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Abstract
Both the international financial system and Denmark were experiencing challenges in 2007
and 2008, and they came to a head in Denmark when Roskilde Bank experienced liquidity
pressures in June 2008. As it became clear that Roskilde Bank was insolvent and no private
solutions would be found, and as the global financial crisis worsened leading to the
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, the Danish government decided to take stronger action.
To ensure the short-term survival of Roskilde Bank, the national bank issued a non-limited
credit facility. After it passed a deposit guarantee scheme in 2008 and established a
Financial Stability Company, the Danish government established a capital injections
program in February 2009. This program was intended primarily to support solvent credit
institutions so that they could stimulate the supply of credit to viable businesses and
households. The injections took the form of subordinated debt, which Danish regulators
considered a form of Tier 1 capital. The program recapitalized institutions up to a Tier I
capital ratio of 12%. In 2009, 43 institutions received DKK 46 billion in capital injections at
an average yield to maturity of 10.08%.
Keywords: Bank Rescue Package I, Bank Rescue Package II, Capital Injections, Denmark,
Global Financial Crisis, Guarantee Scheme

This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project
modules considering broad-based capital injection programs. Cases are available from the Journal of Financial
Crises at https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises/.
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At a Glance

Summary of Key Terms

Denmark’s economy first began to slow
in 2007, due to tight monetary Purpose: To support solvent credit institutions so that
conditions, labor shortages, and rising they can stimulate the supply of credit to businesses and
households.
energy prices, and these problems were
exacerbated by the Global Financial
Announcement: February 3,
Crisis (GFC) of 2008. This manifested in Launch Dates
2009
liquidity pressures on Roskilde Bank in
June 2008, and the Danish national bank Wind-down Dates
Minimum three years after
decided to intervene by issuing a noninjection; no specified
maximum
limited credit facility. As it became clear
that Roskilde Bank was insolvent and no
Up to DKK 100 billion ($15.84
private solutions would be found, and as Program Size
billion)3
the global crisis worsened leading to the
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, the Usage
DKK 46 billion ($7.29 billion)
Danish government decided to take
stronger action. In October 2008, the Outcomes
Danish
government,
Financial
Government-owned
Supervisory Agency (FSA), national bank, Ownership Structure
and
private
bank
consortium
Recapitalized to a Tier 1
(Finansrådet) passed the first of six Bank Notable Features
capital ratio of 12%, above the
Packages creating an unlimited deposit
required 9%
guarantee (see Sabath) and a new statecontrolled organization to take over the
assets of troubled banks called Finansiel Stabilitet.
This paper focuses on the capital injections program, which is the second Bank Package of
February 2009. The Danish Ministry of Economy and Commerce administered the
program. The capital injection program was intended primarily to support solvent credit
institutions so that they could stimulate the supply of credit to viable businesses and
households. The injections took the form of subordinated debt, which the government
considered acceptable as Tier 1 capital. The program recapitalized institutions up to a Tier
1 capital ratio of 12%. In 2009, 43 institutions received DKK 46 billion ($7.29 billion) in
capital injections at an average yield to maturity of 10.08%. By the end of 2010, a total of
50 institutions had also received total support of DKK 193 billion with individual
guarantees.

3

Per Yahoo Finance $1 = DKK 6.31 on July 13, 2021.
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Summary Evaluation
While it is difficult to isolate the effect of this particular policy as part of Denmark’s larger
response to combat the Global Financial Crisis, it is generally acknowledged that the capital
injections scheme greatly improved the capital ratios of all participants. However,
Danmarks Nationalbank acknowledged that the capital injections program, Bank Package
II, could significantly improve banks’ solvency if the subordinated debt were converted into
share capital. Share capital is a higher quality form of capital than subordinated debt
because it is more readily available to bear losses and does not require regular interest
payments. The following figure displays this projection of bank solvency in 2009 after the
capital injections scheme was announced.
Figure 1: Impact of Bank Package II on Bank Solvency Ratios

Source: OECD 2009.
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Denmark Context 2007–2008
GDP
$320.01 billion in 2007
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted to
$355.62 billion in 2008
USD)
GDP per capita
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted to
USD)

Sovereign credit rating (Five-year senior
debt)

Size of banking system
Size of banking system as a percentage of
GDP
Size of banking system as a percentage of
financial system
Five-bank concentration of banking
system

$58,487 per capita in 2007
$64,322 per capita in 2008
As of Q4 2007:
Fitch: AAA
Moody’s: Aaau
S&P: AAAu
As of Q4 2008:
Fitch: AAA
Moody’s: Aaau
S&P: AAAu
$621.0 billion in total assets in 2007
$750.5 billion in total assets in 2008
194.1% in 2007
211.0% in 2008
Data not available for given years
88% of total banking assets in 2007
89% of total banking assets in 2008

Foreign involvement in banking system
Government ownership of banking
system

18% of total banking assets in 2007
18% of total banking assets in 2008
1% of banks owned by the state in
2008
Data not available for the time frame
in Denmark

Existence of deposit insurance

Source: Bloomberg, Call et al. “Bank Ownership – Trends and Implications.”, World
Bank Deposit Insurance Dataset, OECD, World Bank Global Financial Development
Database,
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Key Design Decisions
1. Part of a Package: The capital injections program was the only program in the
Bank Package II but there was a guarantee scheme (Bank Package I) already in
place, and Bank Package II extended this guarantee further.
Prior to the establishment of this capital injections scheme, Denmark passed Bank Rescue
Package I in October 2008 (OECD 2009). This included a government scheme for
participating banks that guaranteed domestic and foreign claims by depositors, debt
holders, and creditors until September 30, 2010, though the guarantee was later extended
to last until 2013. The guarantee covered all Danish banks that were members of the
deposit insurance scheme and Danish branches of foreign banks that did not have such a
scheme in their own countries. Participating banks could not pay dividends, engage in
stock buybacks, or create new stock option arrangements. Ordinary deposits were also
covered by an increased guarantee of DKK 750,000. Bank Package I also included a
winding-up company, the Financial Stability Company, that could facilitate the takeover
and resolution of insolvent banks where they could not find a private solution. The
Financial Stability Company provided capital to help a new company wind up and take over
a failed bank to protect debt holders and creditors; the private sector provided DKK 35
billion to cover losses in this winding-up company. Bank Package I also implemented a ban
on short-selling shares of Danish banks.
Bank Package II was passed in February 2009 and established a capital injections scheme
for which all solvent Danish credit institutions were eligible. To participate, banks issued
subordinated debt to the government. Regulators considered subordinated debt a form of
hybrid Tier 1 capital. Danmarks Nationalbank projected in 2009 that converting the
subordinated debt into share capital would greatly improve the Danish banks’ core capital
ratios (OECD 2009). Bank Package II also authorized the authorities to provide a capital
subscription guarantee to help non-participating banks attract private investors (Denmark
2009a).
The Bank Rescue Package II also amended the Danish Act on Financial Stability by enabling
individual government guarantees for non-subordinated unsecured debt and for loans
issued for financing top-up collateral for institutions issuing særligt dækkede obligationer
and særligt dækkede Realkreditobligationer (SDOs and SDROs) which are covered bonds
and covered mortgage bonds respectively, as well as Danish Ship Finance A/S (Denmark
2009). This individual government guarantee ran up to three years and included loans
issued through December 31, 2010.
2. Legal Authority: The Folketing (Danish Parliament) passed the law establishing
the capital injections scheme, and the European Commission approved
exemption from the State Aid Rules.
The European Commission (EC) approved the capital injections scheme pursuant to their
State Aid policies that aim to avoid distortions of competition that may result from
government policies (EC 2009c). Policies that constitute state aid may be approved if they
help to “remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State” (EC 2009a,). As
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with many similar capital injections schemes in Europe during the GFC, the EC considered
that the program gave beneficiaries an advantage relative to their competitors. However, as
the capital injections program was crucial to remedying liquidity access problems in the
economy, and supported the banking system in Denmark, the EC approved it.
3. Governance/Administration: The Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs was
responsible for evaluating applications for the capital injections scheme and was
enabled to detail requirements on applications, payments, or conversion of
shares.
The Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs could also pass more detailed rules
governing the amount of interest to be paid on the capital injections (Denmark 2009a). The
Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs also supervised credit institutions receiving
capital injections, producing a report every six months on the activity of these institutions.
4. Size, Timing: DKK 100 billion was the maximum budget for capital injections of
hybrid core capital. A total of 50 institutions applied for DKK 63 billion, and 43
institutions ultimately received DKK 46 billion. The capital injection was
extended through December 20, 2009.
Through Bank Package II, Denmark made DKK 100 billion available for capital injections of
hybrid core capital to solvent banks and mortgage lenders, allowing them to reach a Tier 1
capital ratio of up to 12% (Denmark 2009a). The use of the capital injections scheme by all
eligible institutions to achieve a 12% Tier I capital ratio would have involved
approximately DKK 100 billion (EC 2009a). A total of 50 institutions applied for DKK 63
billion in total (OECD 2009). In 2009, 43 institutions received DKK 46 billion in capital
injections at an average yield to maturity of 10.08% (Danmarks Nationalbank 2011).
The amount of capital provided was decided based on the individual institution’s
capitalization and risk profile along criteria such as basis capital, deposit deficit, liquidity
risk, and quality and earning of credit (EC 2009a).
Applications for the capital injections were initially accepted until June 30, 2009. On July
10, 2009, the Danish authorities extended the time frame to perform capital injections until
December 20, 2009, as they needed more time to review the 50 applications they had
received (EC 2009b).
5. Source of funding: The funds for capital injections come from the central
government account at Danmarks Nationalbank.
The Minister of Economic and Business Affairs, upon making an agreement with an
institution to perform a capital injection, could use the government account at Danmarks
Nationalbank to fund the capital injection (Denmark 2009a).
6. Eligible institutions: The bank recapitalization scheme was voluntary and
available to all solvent credit institutions.
Eligible institutions were primarily bank and mortgage credit institutions that fulfilled the
solvency requirements established by the Danish Financial Supervisory Authority (EC
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2009a). Subsidiaries of foreign banks in Denmark were also eligible if they used the capital
injection to ensure consolidation and increase lending in Denmark (Denmark 2009a).
Applications for capital injections required explanations of the financial institution’s
economic situation, capital adequacy, and future projections, with an independent audit
(EC 2009a).
7. Individual participation limit: Institutions were recapitalized until they reached
a Tier 1 capital ratio of 12%.
For institutions that met the prior Tier 1 capital ratio of 9% or more, the capital injections
scheme offered a maximum increase in Tier 1 capital of 3% up to a ratio of 12% Tier 1
capital (Denmark 2009a; EC 2009a). Credit institutions with a Tier 1 capital ratio between
6% and 9% were offered a capital injection to achieve a 12% Tier 1 capital ratio.
Institutions below a 6% Tier 1 capital ratio were required to individually negotiate with
Danish Authorities prior to applying for the capital injections scheme.
The 12% Tier 1 capital ratio target was supported by a stress test prepared by the Danish
National Bank based on three scenarios for the 15 largest Danish banks. This was decided
on the basis of the Danish National Bank concluding that a Tier 1 capital ratio of 13.5%
would allow those 15 banks to individually meet their capital needs (EC 2009a). The
central bank said that the target 12% level would increase banks’ ability to get capital
market funding and support the real economy.
The stress test considered three scenarios. In the first scenario, the financial crisis would
lead to a deep international recession, entailing lower demand for Danish products; central
banks worldwide would adopt a more expansionary monetary-policy stance, and interest
rates would fall. In the second scenario, the financial crisis would prompt the Danish banks
to significantly reduce their lending; the Danish economy would experience a credit crunch.
The third scenario was a combination of the first two scenarios, in which a deep
international recession would coincide with a credit crunch in Denmark, causing a
historical decline in economic activity (EC 2009a). The stress test accounted for the fact
that banks could not pay dividends for two years due to the State guarantee issued in
October 2008, and that the banks had to contribute to the guarantee scheme. The stress
test modelled the pressure on bank earnings and capital adequacy that would result from
the scenarios modeled.
8. Capital characteristics: The program injected noncumulative, perpetual
subordinated debt; the authorities later gave banks the option of converting the
debt into equity.
The capital injections took the form of perpetual subordinated debt with no voting rights
(Denmark 2009a). Interest payments were noncumulative. Reimbursement of the injected
capital could start after the third year at 100% of the face value plus interest but was
subject to step-up provisions after five and seven years. After the fifth year, the instrument
was callable at 105% of the face value plus interest, and as of the seventh year at 110%.
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The government had no conversion rights, but the subordinated loans were transferable
(EC 2009a).
On July 10, 2009, the Danish authorities extended the time frame to perform capital
injections until December 20, 2009, as they needed more time to review the 50 applications
they had received. In addition, they made it possible for participating banks to convert their
subordinated debt into share capital within five years of the initial injection. This was to
enhance the quality of capital issued by participating banks under the program. The
initially issued subordinated debt, as notified on January 23, 2009, did not fully meet
markets’ and rating agencies’ expectations in terms of quality of capital issued and did not
satisfy rating agencies' standards for core Tier 1 capital. With the conversion option, the
debt would qualify as core Tier 1 capital. Therefore, by introducing this conversion option,
Danish authorities were hoping to ensure that participating banks could maximize the use
of capital injection for external rating purposes while minimizing changes to the authorized
original plan (EC 2009b).
The conversion option was available for five years after issuance and could be exercised to
avoid the step-up provisions related to interest rates and reimbursement prices; the
conversion option was thus an incentive for banks to convert the subordinated debt into
ordinary shares to avoid higher payments (EC 2009b).
Several criteria had to be met in order for a bank to exercise its conversion option and
benefit from the higher capital quality (EC 2009b). First, the banks’ shares had to be
trading in a regulated market. Second, the issuing bank’s total hybrid Tier 1 capital had to
be more than 35% of its total Tier 1 capital. Third, the conversion amount at any given time
could not exceed 20% of the original capital injection received by the bank.
The conversion price included a 5% discount from the average share price derived over
three working days from the conversion date, limiting the ability of issuers to use the
conversion option to entirely avoid the step-up clauses. For the conversion option, banks
had to pay an additional annual fee of 20 to 60 bps, as per European Central Bank (ECB)
recommendations, to align it with the range of remuneration set up for ordinary shares.
The European Commission (EC) verified appropriate fee levels of convertible hybrid capital
on a case-by-case basis. The EC considered these conditions appropriate to safeguard the
use of the capital injections scheme and avoid undue distortions of competition as required
by the State Aid policy.
9. Interest/Dividend: The rate charged on the capital injection was determined by a
bank’s capitalization and risk profile.
According to their capitalization and risk profiles, potential recipient credit institutions
were divided into three categories which determined their interest rate (EC 2009a). Credit
institutions in Group I (ratings of AA- or above) qualified for an interest rate of
approximately 9%; Group II (ratings between A- and A+) qualified for an interest rate of
approximately 9.55%; and Group III (ratings at or below BBB+) qualified for interest rates
of approximately 11.25%. Institutions without a rating were manually sorted into one of
these three groups based on the criteria above.
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Four years after the capital injection, interest rates would be fixed at the greater of the
fixed interest rate or 125% of the dividend payments to ordinary shareholders.
The expected yearly return of these capital injections was approximately 10%, but the
interest was noncumulative.
10. Allocation of losses to stakeholders: In the case of bankruptcy, losses would first
be covered by equity, then the injected subordinated debt, followed by other
debt holders and creditors (EC 2009a).
In the case of bankruptcy, losses would first be covered by equity, then the injected
subordinated debt, followed by other debt holders and creditors (EC 2009a). No further
materials relating to the motivation behind this design were found.
11. Fate of management: There were no explicit requirements for management
changes, although there were restrictions on management compensation.
Executives could not receive additional share compensation even through the extension of
previous programs (Denmark 2009a). Variable salary compensation for executive board in
financial companies could not exceed 50% of the total basic salary including pension.
12. Other conditions: Recipients of capital injections had to commit to promoting
lending to the real economy and were banned from paying dividends until 2010.
Credit institutions benefitting from capital injections also had to produce reports on their
lending every six months that would later be consolidated and published (EC 2009a). These
reports included information on the loans made, including the industry of the recipient, the
share of credit to households and companies, the size of loans, and credit conditions.
Subsidiaries of foreign credit institutions based in Denmark had to commit not to transfer
their capital injections to their parent companies.
Institutions receiving capital injections were banned from making dividend payments in
2009 and 2010. They could only pay out dividends covered by their annual profits
thereafter (EC 2009a). Until the recipient exited the capital injection program, they were
also banned from creating stock option programs for management and from repurchasing
stock.
13. Exit strategy: The capital injection could be paid back after the third year at
100% of the face value plus interest; the callable value was stepped up
afterwards.
The injected capital was callable at 100% starting the fourth year. After five years, it was
callable at 105% face value plus interest, and after seven years, it was callable at 110% face
value plus interest (EC 2009a). The Danish authorities did not have any conversion rights,
and the recipient institutions could not reimburse their capital before the beginning of the
fourth year. However, the Danish state could transfer the capital. The minimum waiting
period of three years before exiting the capital injections was intended to create stability
for recipient institutions and provide a clear incentive to lend, addressing the credit
squeeze of the financial crisis.
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